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No Change in Sight for Sentencing Guidelines 
In the post-Booker era, the commission must reinvent itself to provide a useful tool for the courts in determining punishment, 
explains Wes Reber Porter of Golden Gate University School of Law. 
Wes Reber Porter 
2011-12-0801 :40:20 PM 
The past decade has brought dramatic and progressive change to criminal sentencing in federal court. The continued utility of the 
United States Sentencing Commission and its sentencing guidelines miraculously survived this change. The Supreme Court, in its 
2006 decision in US. v. Booker, rescued the guidelines from obscurity in order to continue to promote the sentencing policy goals of 
uniform ity and proportionality. However, the next im portant change needed is the least likely to occur - the Sentencing Com m iss ion 
itself must steward the "evolution" of its guidelines. 
District judges routinely reject certain provisions of the guidelines as unhelpful. The Sentencing Com mission must reinvent itself by 
reshaping its guidelines post-Booker. To start, the commission should remove the provisions in the guidelines that courts regularly 
exercise their discretion to disregard. And examples of routinely disregarded guideline provisions are not hard to find. 
For example, the guidelines still require district judges to calculate and consult artificially enhanced punishments based upon often 
uncharged - and sometimes acquitted - conduct called "relevant conduct." The guidelines still require courts to consult its 
recidivism (re-)classifications such as the "career offender" provision. Here, the judge has all the details of the defendant's criminal 
history and resulting (already severe) sentencing range, yet the guidelines require the court to consider a more severe sentence 
because of its recidivism label. The guidelines still require parties to litigate, and judges to find, whether conduct qualifies for other 
guideline-created labels, such as whether it is "serious ," "violent" or "sophisticated." 
HOW THE GUIDaINES SURVIVED 
Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 to promote uniform and proportional sentences imposed throughout the 
country. This legislation created the Sentencing Commission that then created the sentencing guidelines. For more than two 
decades, the sentencing guidelines were mandatory. During this time, Congress also enacted legislation that made punishments 
under the guidelines harsher. 
The court in Booker restored district judges' discretion to fashion fair and just sentences for individual defendants. Due to the almost 
20 years of case law, however, the Booker court also artfully rescued the guidelines from obscurity. The court labeled the guidelines 
"advisory." It then set forth a process that required the district court to calculate and consult the applicable guideline range during 
sentencing. The Sentencing Commission would continue to regulate federal sentencing and serve the original goals of the SRA 
In the five years after Booker, district judges generally have em braced the sentencing policy goals, consulted the guidelines and 
imposed "reasonable" sentences. Congress fortunately has not attempted to legislate a fix to a sentencing process thatis not yet 
broken. The federal sentencing process has played out as intended by the Supreme Court and as well as could have been expected 
for the Sentencing Commission. Yet, with respect to these unhelpful guideline provisions, district judges are required to make 
findings about them and consult the resulting calculation, but they then may exercise their discretion to ignore the provisions when 
imposing a sentence. 
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Congress always intended the guidelines to evolve. And they did evolve during the almost 20 years when the guidelines were 
binding upon the courts (1998 to 2006 - "the guidelines era"). Because the court rendered the guidelines "advisory," Congress no 
longer has an incentive to enact legislation that affects the guidelines. District courts with sentencing discretion similarly have no 
continued interest in shaping the guidelines. The Sentencing Commission instead must reinvent itself and it can start by removing 
the provisions in the guidelines that courts regularly disregard. 
A LOOSE 'ANCHORING' CALCULATION 
District judges enjoy the discretion they sought during sentencing. With any exercise of discretion comes a need for information. In 
federal sentencing, providing the district judges with information to exercise their discretion is not the problem. District judges 
receive, in most criminal felony cases, a pre-sentence report which contains an enormous amount of information to guide the 
sentencing court's discretion. In fact, federal district judges receive far more information about the individual defendant, his criminal 
history and the offense conduct than other courts imposing sentences in our country. 
Many provisions in the guidelines do not provide any helpful information to the court at sentencing. Only the resulting calculation is 
helpful to the court as an "anchoring" reference for its sentence. In consulting the guideline calculation, the district judge learns what 
the likely sentence for a similar defendant committing a similar offense would have been during the guidelines era (1988 to 2006). 
Consulting the guideline calculation can still assist district judges in exerCising their discretion. The court in Booker rendered an ail-
or-nothing decision when it saved the guidelines; yet, not all provisions in the guidelines were worthy of saving. 
Every year since 2006, the sentences imposed bydistrictjudges have drifted further below the "anchoring" guideline calculation. 
Among different offenses, geographic regions and individual defendant's demographic data, federal sentences slide lower each 
year. The commission dismisses the trend as insignificant. But the anchor of the guideline calculation is loosening and becoming 
less helpful to the sentencing court. 
There are many explanations for the lower sentences since Booker. Many believe that the guidelines were skewed too high. Others 
argue that district judges, particularly guideline-era judges, have gained greater comfort with sentencing discretion and accounting 
for individual circumstances. The explanation, however, also may reflect the district judges' exercise of their discretion to disregard 
unhelpful proviSions in the guidelines. The sentencing commission should review these trends and remove generallydisregarded 
provisions of the guidelines to promote continued uniformity and proportionality. 
THE CUTTING ROOM FLOOR FOR THE GUIDB.INES 
Information guides judicial discretion. The district court routinely receives all the information it needs. For example, the court already 
considers all the conduct "relevant" to an offense and all of the details of a defendant's "criminal history," whether it contributes to the 
calculation or not. It is already included in the PSR. Thus, with or without the guidelines' calculations, district court judges have the 
information to exercise their discretion. 
Many provisions in the guidelines involve wholly unhelpful manipulations and recategorizations of information already available to 
the court. In fact, certain problematic provisions skew the "anchoring" guideline calculation and mislead the district court's 
sentencing decis ion. The Sentencing Com mission should endeavor to weed these provis ions out of the guidelines. 
The patently unhelpful "relevant conduct" guideline provision may be the best example. It requires district judges, in some cases, to 
consider a different (and harsher) punishment based upon often uncharged - and sometimes acquitted - conduct. Because, 
again, the district court already considers this information, an artifiCially inflated calculation based upon so-called "relevant" conduct 
is not helpful, and is instead misleading. 
No one would miss the "relevant conduct" provision of the guidelines if it disappeared tomorrow. Instead, the district judge must 
calculate, consult and then disregard a calculation elevated by relevant conduct to arrive at a fair and just sentence. The Sentencing 
Commission can end this circularity by removing it. 
Other unhelpful and misleading guideline provisions are not difficult to identify. Critics and district judges have demonstrated them 
to the Sentencing Commission for decades. District judges cite for appellate courts their own "disagreement" with certain provisions 
as justification for imposing a sentence below the anchoring guideline range. 
NEW ROLE FOR THE SENTENCING COMMISSION 
The Sentencing Commission should appreciate that only a meaningful guideline calculation assists the court when exercising its 
discretion, and that only a meaningful anchoring reference continues to promote uniform and proportional sentences in federal 
court. The anchoring guideline calculation could have sustained meaning in the post-Booker sentencing process if the Sentencing 
Com mission evaluated trends and trim med the guidelines back. Without a dram atic change, the post-Booker sentencing process 
will become increasingly inefficient and largely a waste oftime and resources. 
The much needed stewardship is not likely to happen. The Sentencing Commission should review its guidelines with an eye toward 
informing the sentencing court's discretion. The commission should reconsider certain guideline prOvisions understanding that the 
underlying information is already made available to the district court. It should start by rooting out all potentially misleading and 
routinely disregarded prOvisions -like "relevant conduct." 
law.com/jsp/ca/PubArticieFriendlyCA.jsp?id=1202534937869 2/3 
12/13/11 The Recorder: No Change in Sight for Sentencing Guidelines 
Wes Reber Porter is an associate professor at Golden Gate University School of Law where he teaches evidence, evidence in the 
courtroom, trial advocacy and white-collar crime. In practice, he was a senior trial attorney for the DOJ's Criminal Division, fraud 
section, an assistant U.S. attorney and Navy JAG Corps trial counsel. 
In Practice articles inform readers on developments in substantive law, practice issues or law firm management. Contact Vitaly 
Gashpar with submissions or questions at vgashpar@alm.com. 
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